We consider a many-sorted variant of Japaridze's polymodal provability logic GLP. In this variant, propositional variables are assigned sorts n < ω, where variables of sort n are arithmetically interpreted as Πn+1-sentences of the arithmetical hierarchy. We prove that the many-sorted variant is arithmetically complete with respect to this interpretation.
Introduction
The polymodal provability logic GLP, due to Japaridze [15] , has received considerable interest in the mathematical-logic community. For every n ≥ 0, the language of GLP features modalities n that can be arithmetically interpreted as n-consistency, i.e., a modal formula n ϕ expresses under this interpretation that ϕ is consistent with the set of all true Π n -sentences. This particular interpretation steered interest in GLP in mainstream proof theory: Beklemishev [3] showed how GLP can act as a framework in order to canonically recover an ordinal notation system for Peano arithmetic (PA) and its fragments. Moreover, based on these notions, he obtained a rather abstract version of Gentzen's consistency proof for PA by transfinite induction up to ε 0 and he formulated a combinatorial statement independent from PA [5] .
This proof-theoretic analysis is based on the notion of graded provability algebra. Let T be an extension of PA and L T be an algebra whose elements are equivalence classes of the relation
Furthermore, let {ϕ} denote the equivalence class of ϕ with respect to ∼. Equipping L T with the standard Boolean connectives and the relation {ϕ} ≤ {ψ} ⇐⇒ df T ⊢ ϕ → ψ turns L T into a Boolean algebra, the Lindenbaum algebra of T . Thus, logical notions are brought into an algebraic setting. The maximal element ⊤ and the minimal element ⊥ of this algebra are, respectively, the classes of all provable and all refutable sentences of T . Deductively closed extensions of T correspond to filters of L T (see ref. [4] for details).
Let n T be a Π n+1 -formula that formalizes the notion of n-consistency in arithmetic. The graded provability algebra M T of T is the algebra L T extended by operators n T defined on the elements of L T by n T : {ϕ} −→ { n T ϕ}, for n ≥ 0.
Terms in the language of M T can be identified with polymodal formulas. Furthermore, for each sound and axiomatizable extension T of PA, Japaridze's arithmetical completeness theorem for GLP states that
where p are all the propositional variables from ϕ( p). The algebra M T carries an additional structure in form of a distinguished family of subsets
where P n is defined by the class of Π n+1 -sentences of the arithmetical hierarchy. This family of subsets is called stratification of M T [3] . Since n T is a Π n+1 -formula, the operator n T maps M T to P n . The presence of a stratification admits to turn M T into a many-sorted algebravariables of sort n range over arithmetical Π n+1 -sentences. The notion of sort can be naturally extended to capture polymodal terms. It is the goal of this paper to investigate a modal-logical counterpart to this many-sorted algebra.
To this end, we define a many-sorted variant of GLP, denoted by GLP * , which has variables of sort n, for every n ≥ 0. Substitution in this logic is required to respect the sorts of variables. Our main result is a Solovay-style arithmetical completeness theorem for GLP * , i.e., for any sound and axiomatizable extension T of PA we have
where p are all propositional variables from ϕ( p) and a quantifier binding such a variable of sort n only ranges over elements from P n . In particular, we show that the principle of Σ n+1 -completeness,
(where p is of sort n), in addition to the postulates of GLP, suffices to obtain arithmetical completeness. A logic that contains this principle has been studied by Visser [18] who introduced a Σ 1 -provability logic of PA, i.e., in this logic, variables are arithmetically interpreted as Σ 1 -sentences (see also Boolos [12] and Ardeshir and Mojtahedi [1] ). The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After this introductory section, we introduce basic notions in Section 2. In Section 3 we prove the arithmetical completeness theorem for GLP * . We continue our exposition with some further results in Section 4 and conclude the paper in Section 5.
modalities. The dual connectives [n], for every n ≥ 0, are abbreviations where [n]ϕ stands for ¬ n ¬ϕ. The notion of a formula is defined in the usual way. The logic GLP is axiomatized by the following axiom schemes and rules:
(v) n ϕ → m ϕ, for m < n (monotonicity); and (vi) modus ponens and ϕ → ψ/ n ϕ → n ψ.
GLP
* is formulated over a propositional language that contains variables each being assigned a unique sort α, where 0 ≤ α ≤ ω. By writing p α , we indicate that the variable p α has sort α. The notion of sort is defined for all formulas as follows:
(i) ⊤ and ⊥ have sort 0;
(ii) ϕ ∧ ψ and ϕ ∨ ψ have sort max{α, β} if ϕ and ψ have the respective sorts α and β; (iii) ¬ϕ has sort α + 1 if ϕ has sort α; and (iv) n ϕ has sort n, for n < ω.
We denote by |ϕ| the sort of ϕ. The sort ω is explicitly included to provide variables that can explicitly be assigned an arbitrary arithmetical sentence in an arithmetical interpretation. In contrast, variables of finite n < ω can be assigned arithmetical Π n+1 -sentences (see below). Note that if |¬ϕ| = α, then α is a successor ordinal.
The logic GLP * is now axiomatized by the following axiom schemes and rules of inference:
(i) all tautologies of classical propositional logic;
(ii) schemes (i), (ii), (iii), and (v) of GLP; The logic GLP is not complete for any class of Kripke frames [14] . Therefore, Beklemishev [6] considers a weaker logic J that is complete with respect to a natural class of Kripke frame and to which GLP is reducible. We do so as well and define a many-sorted counterpart J * of J which arises from GLP * by dropping monotonicity and adding the scheme 
(iii) ¬ψ = W \ ψ , and similarly for the other propositional connectives; and
We often write A, x |= ϕ instead of x ∈ ϕ . Similarly, we also write x ϕ instead of x ∈ ϕ when A is clear from the context. We say that ϕ is valid in A, denoted by A |= ϕ, if A, x |= ϕ for every x ∈ W .
A (ii) ∀x, y (xR n y ⇒ ∀z (xR m z ⇔ yR m z)), for m < n; and
A J * -model is a Kripke model that is based on a J * -frame. Such a model A = W, {R n } n≥0 , · is called strongly persistent if it satisfies the following two conditions: (i) if |p| ≤ n and y p, then x p whenever xR n y; and (ii) if |p| < n and y p, then x p whenever xR n y.
The following facts are easy to establish. 
Proof (Sketch).
The soundness direction is a straightforward induction on proof length. For completeness, the standard methods used to construct canonical Kripke models can be used to show that J * is complete for the class of finite and strongly persistent J * -models. Roughly, the argument can be sketched as follows.
We define an operator ∼, called modified negation, for all formulas ϕ as follows:
For a set ∆ of formulas, we define ℓ(∆) := {n | n ϕ ∈ ∆ for some ϕ}. Following [6] , we say that a set ∆ of formulas is adequate if ⊤ ∈ ∆ and it is closed under subformulas, modified negations, and the operations
for all variables p m and n ≥ m, and
We can easily convince ourselves that any finite set Γ can be extended to a finite set Γ ′ which is adequate and such that ℓ(Γ) = ℓ(Γ ′ ). Let us now fix a finite adequate set ∆ and assume that all modalities range within Λ := ℓ(∆). Define a Kripke frame F ∆ = W, {R n } n≥0 , where
for n ∈ Λ and x, y ∈ W , and xR n y holds if the following conditions are satisfied:
(ii) For any n ϕ ∈ ∆, we have that n ϕ ∈ y implies n ϕ ∈ x.
(iii) For any m ϕ ∈ ∆ such that m < n, we have m ϕ ∈ x ⇐⇒ m ϕ ∈ y.
(iv) There exists a formula n ϕ ∈ ∆ such that n ϕ ∈ x \ y.
For any natural number n ∈ Λ, set R n := ∅. Furthermore, define a Kripke model A ∆ = F ∆ , · , where
for all variables p ∈ ∆ and x ∈ W . It can be shown that, for all ϕ ∈ ∆,
Moreover, using the axioms of Σ n -completeness, A ∆ can be easily shown to be a finite and strongly persistent J * -model. Using these facts, completeness follows in the usual way. Suppose J * ϕ. Then {∼ϕ} is J * -consistent. Let ∆ be the smallest finite adequate set containing ϕ. Then A ∆ is a finite and strongly persistent J * -model. There is a maximal
Formal Arithmetic. We consider first-order theories in the language L 0 = (0, +, ·, s) of arithmetic (where s is a unary function symbol for the successor function). Theories and formulas formulated in (an extension of) this language will be called arithmetical. The theories we consider will be extensions of Peano arithmetic (PA). It will be convenient to assume that the language of PA contains terms for all primitive recursive functions. It is well-known that PA can be conservatively extended so as to contain definitions of all these terms. The class of ∆ 0 -formulas are all formulas where each occurrence of a quantifier is of either forms
where t is a term over L 0 that has no occurrence of the variable x. Occurrences of such quantifiers are called bounded. The classes of Σ n -and Π n -formulas are defined inductively: ∆ 0 -formulas are Σ 0 -and Π 0 -formulas. If ϕ( x, y) is a Π n -formula, then ∃y ϕ( x, y) is a Σ n+1 -formula. Similarly, if ϕ( x, y) is a Σ n -formula, then ∀y ϕ( x, y) is a Π n+1 -formula. When an arithmetical theory T is given, we often identify these classes modulo provable equivalence in T .
We recursively define 0 := 0 and n + 1 := s(n). The expression n is called the n-th numeral and represents the number n in L 0 . We assume a standard global assignment · of expressions (terms, formulas, etc.) to natural numbers. Given any expression τ , we call τ the code or Gödel number of τ . Note that τ , being a natural number, "lives" in our informal metatheory and has a natural representation in L 0 through the term τ . However, when presenting formulas in the arithmetical language, we usually write τ instead of τ . We often consider primitive recursive families of formulas ϕ n that depend on a parameter n ∈ ω. In this context, ϕ x denotes a primitive recursive definable term with free variable x whose value for a given n is the Gödel number of ϕ n . In particular, the expression ϕ(ẋ) denotes a primitive recursive definable term whose value given any n is the Gödel number of ϕ(n), i.e., the Gödel number of the formula resulting from ϕ when substituting the term n for x. Following [7] , it is convenient to assume a second sort of first-order variables, denoted α, β, . . ., that range over codes of arithmetical formulas. Formulas containing such variables can be naturally translated into the one-sorted setting by making use of a primitive recursive predicate that defines the notion of "being a formula."
A theory T is sound if T ⊢ ϕ implies N |= ϕ, for every arithmetical sentence ϕ. For an axiomatizable extension T of PA, we denote by ✷ T (α) the formula that formalizes the notion of provability in T in the usual sense. We write ✷ T ϕ instead of ✷ T ( ϕ ). The formula ✷ T defines the standard Gödelian provability predicate for T . More generally, given a formula Prv(α) with one free variable α, we say that Prv is a provability predicate of level n over T , if for all arithmetical sentences ϕ, ψ:
It is well-known that ✷ T , in its standard formulation, is a provability predicate of level 0. A provability predicate Prv is sound if N |= Prv( ϕ ) implies N |= ϕ, for every arithmetical sentence ϕ. A sequence π of formulas Prv 0 , Prv 1 , . . . is a strong sequence of provability predicates over T if there is a sequence r 0 < r 1 < · · · of natural numbers such that, for all n ≥ 0, (i) Prv n is a provability predicate of level r n over T ; and Since provability predicate [n] π from π is a Σ k -sentence for some k > 0, we can associate (in analogy to the standard Gödelian provability predicate) a predicate Prf n (α, y) which expresses the statement "y codes a proof of α" and T ⊢ Prv n (α) ↔ ∃y Prf n (α, y).
We stress that Prf n is chosen in such a way such that every number y codes a proof of at most one formula and that every provable formula has arbitrarily long proofs.
We denote by True Πn (α) the well-known truth-definition for the class of all Π n -sentences, i.e., True Πn (α) expresses the fact "α is the Gödel number of a true arithmetical Π n -sentence." The truth-definition for Π n -sentences serves as a basis for a natural strong sequence of provability predicates. Let [0] T := ✷ T and
The formula [n] T is a provability predicate of level n. It formalizes the notion of being provable in the theory T + Th Πn (N), where Th Πn (N) is the set of all true Π n -sentences.
Another strong sequence of provability predicates is defined by [0] ω := ✷ PA and
The predicate [n] ω is of level 2n and formalizes the notion of provability by n applications of the ω-rule. Japardize originally showed arithmetical completeness for this arithmetical interpretation, while completeness with respect to the broader class of arithmetical interpretations, defined by strong sequences of provability predicates, was later established by Ignatiev [14] .
3
Arithmetical Interpretation. Let π be a strong sequence of provability predicates over T . An (arithmetical) realization (over π) is a function f π that maps propositional variables to arithmetical sentences. The realization f π is typed if f π (p) is an arithmetical Π |πn|+1 -sentence, provided n = |p| < ω. Any realization f π can be uniquely extended to a mapf π that captures all polymodal formulas as follows:
where ⊥ (resp., ⊤) is a convenient contradictory (resp., tautological) statement in the language of arithmetic;
(ii)f π (p) = f π (p), for any propositional variable p;
(iii)f π (·) commutes with the propositional connectives; and
By some simple closure properties of the class of Π n -sentences, its follows that |ϕ| = n implies thatf π (ϕ) is provably equivalent to a Π |πn|+1 -sentence in T . Using this, we readily observe:
Proof. The lemma is shown by induction on the length of a proof of ϕ in GLP * . Most of the axioms are clear. In particular, the provability of the instances Löb's axiom is well-known. The axiom of Σ n+1 -completeness follows from our discussion above. The induction step, i.e., closure under the rules of inference, is easy to establish. We leave the details to the reader.
Hence, GLP * is sound for the arithmetical semantics thus defined. Completeness holds under the additional assumption of soundness of the provability predicates involved. Arithmetical completeness for GLP * has first been established by Japaridze [15] and has been significantly extended and simplified by Ignatiev [14] . Beklemishev [7] provided yet another simplified proof for the arithmetical completeness theorem for GLP * that is close to Solovay's original construction for the logic GL. The next section will be devoted to the proof of the arithmetical completeness theorem for GLP * . To this end, we are going to extend the construction for GLP described in ref. [7] .
Arithmetical Completeness
Arithmetical completeness proofs usually rely on reasonable Kripke semantics, since those proofs usually establish the following fact: if ϕ is a formula that has a Kripke model falsifying ϕ in a certain world, one can find an arithmetical realization such that the arithmetical theory under consideration does not prove ϕ under this realization. Since GLP is, however, not complete for any class of Kripke frames, Beklemishev reduces GLP to J and relies on the Kripke semantics of J in order to prove arithmetical completeness. We proceed analogously in the following.
To this end, we define formulas M (ϕ) and M + (ϕ) as follows [7] . Consider an enumeration m 1 ϕ 1 , m 2 ϕ 2 , . . . , m s ϕ s of all subformulas of ϕ of the form k ψ and let n := max i≤s m i . Define
and, furthermore,
By the monotonicity axioms, it is clear that GLP * ⊢ M + (ϕ). We are going to prove the following statement.
Theorem 3.1. Let T be a sound axiomatizable extension of PA and π a strong sequence of provability predicates over T of which every provability predicate is sound. Then, for all manysorted formulas ϕ, the following statements are equivalent:
Before turning to the proof of this theorem, let us introduce some additional notions. A root of a J * -model A = W, {R n } n≥0 , · is a world r ∈ W such that for all x ∈ W there is a k ≥ 0 such that rR k x or r = x. A model which has a root is called rooted. The following lemma can be proved similarly as in ref. [7] . 
Notice that A 0 is still a finite and strongly persistent J * -model such that A 0 , r |= M + (ϕ) → ϕ. Let m be the least number such that R m = ∅ and R k = ∅ for all k > m. As in ref. [7] , we define the following auxiliary notions:
Furthermore, Solovay functions h n : ω → W 0 are defined for all n ≤ m as follows:
Here, ℓ k = x is a formalization of the statement that the function h k (defined by a formula H k (x, y)) has as its limit at x, i.e.,
The defining formulas H k can be constructed via a diagonalization argument; see [7] for details. For x ∈ W 0 , S x denotes the sentence ℓ m = x. The following lemmas are established in ref. [7] .
Lemma 3.4. The following conditions hold for the sentences S x :
, for all x = 0; and
Proof. Item (i) is clear from Lemma 3.3. Item (ii) is proved by an external induction on n from (i).
Lemma 3.6. For the arithmetical realization f π defined by
Proof (Sketch). Lemma 3.6 can be proved by first establishing Solovay's "commutation lemma" which says that, for each world x = 0 and each subformula χ of ϕ, it holds that
Indeed, now suppose that T ⊢f π (ϕ). Then A, 1 |= ϕ implies that T ⊢ S 1 → ¬f π (ϕ). Hence, T ⊢ ¬S 1 and so T ⊢ ¬ 0 π S 1 , whence T ⊢ ¬S 0 by item (ii) of Lemma 3.4. This contradicts item (iv) of Lemma 3.4.
It therefore suffices to show that f π is a typed arithmetical realization using the assumption that A 0 is a strongly persistent J * -model. To this end, we assume a natural arithmetization of the forcing relation on A 0 by bounded formulas.
Lemma 3.7. For any variable
Proof. For the direction from left to right, we reason in T as follows. Assume f π (p) and, towards a contradiction, suppose that ∃x h k (x) = w for some w ∈ W 0 such that w p. By item (iv) of Lemma 3.3, we know that, provably in T , ∃x h k (x) = u implies
for any u ∈ W 0 . In particular, we infer
Since A 0 is strongly persistent and w p, we know that u p for all u ∈ R * k (w). This contradicts f π (p) by item (i) of Lemma 3.4.
For the other direction, we reason in T as follows. Assume the right-hand side of the equivalence. We certainly know that ¬S u for all u ∈ W 0 such that u p. Now, if ℓ k = ℓ m , then, by item (i) of Lemma 3.4, S x for some x ∈ W 0 such that x p and we are thus finished. So suppose that ℓ k = ℓ m . We know that ℓ k p, since ∀x h k (x) = w for all w ¬p. Assume now that ℓ m ¬p. By Lemma 3.5, there must be a j ∈ (k, m] such that ℓ k R j ℓ m . By strong persistence, for any x, y ∈ W 0 such that xR j y, it holds that
Thus, ℓ m ¬p is impossible and therefore ℓ m p by item (i) of Lemma 3.4.
Lemma 3.8. For every variable
in T as required, since it is provably equivalent to a conjunction of sentences which are Π |π k |+2 in T . If k ≤ m, then by Lemma 3.7 we know that, provably in T ,
Therefore, f π defines a typed arithmetical realization as desired. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Further Results
In this section, we briefly comment on some additional results concerning GLP * . For a detailed exposition, we refer the interested reader to Berger [11] .
Truth Provability Logic. By the truth provability logic GLPS we understand the set of all modal formulas in the language of GLP that are true in the standard model of arithmetic under every arithmetical realization (see ref. Beklemishev [7] , Ignatiev [14] , Japaridze [15] ). The methods above can be easily extended to characterize a many-sorted analogue of GLPS, which we denote by GLPS * . More precisely, let GLPS * denote the logic consisting of the set of theorems of GLP * extended by the schema ϕ → n ϕ (n ≥ 0) and with modus ponens as its sole rule of inference. Let n 1 ϕ 1 , . . . , n s ϕ s be an enumeration of all subformulas from ϕ of the form k ψ. Let
The following theorem can be proved as in ref. [7] . Theorem 4.1. Let T be a sound axiomatizable extension of PA and π a strong sequence of provability predicates over T of which every provability predicate is sound. Then, for all manysorted formulas ϕ, the following statements are equivalent:
Reduction of GLP * to GLP. Note that Theorem 3.1 yields a reduction from GLP * to J * . However, the formula M + (ϕ) is, in a sense, inconvenient since its size does not depend on the size of ϕ and, additionally, M + (ϕ) is not necessarily in the language of ϕ. We borrow a result from [10] to improve upon that. Let m 1 ϕ 1 , m 2 ϕ 2 , . . . , m s ϕ s be an enumeration of all subformulas of ϕ of the form k ψ such that i < j implies m i ≤ m j . Define
Lemma 4.2. For all formulas ϕ,
Proof Let ϕ be a formula from L * and let p 1 , . . . , p k exhaust all variables from ϕ and let α 1 , . . . , α k be their respective sorts. Furthermore, let Θ ⊆ ω be a set of modalities. Define
In the following, if we claim that a one-sorted logic (like GLP) proves a many-sorted formula, we mean that the one-sorted logic proves the formula which results from the many-sorted one if we simply disregard the sorts. [7] together with a result of [10] that this implies
Recall that J is complete with respect to the class of all J * -models (there called J-models). So let A = W, {R α } α<ω , · be a J * -model with root r such that
and A is rooted, it is easy to see that A is strongly persistent by the construction of R + Θ (ϕ). (Notice that A can be chosen such that R α = ∅ for all α ∈ Θ, since the formula depicted in (1) is in the language of ϕ.) Therefore, J * N + (ϕ) → ϕ and so GLP * ϕ follows.
We say that a logic L has the Craig interpolation property if, whenever L ⊢ ϕ → ψ, then there is an η containing only variables which are present in ϕ and ψ such that both L ⊢ ϕ → η and L ⊢ η → ψ. Proof. Suppose GLP * ⊢ ϕ → ψ. Let Θ be the set of all modalities from ϕ → ψ. By Lemma 4.3, we have
Ignatiev [14] showed that GLP has the Craig interpolation property. Hence, there is an η containing only variables which occur in R Proof. Shapirovsky [17] showed that deciding whether GLP ⊢ ϕ is complete for PSpace. For membership, in order to check whether GLP * ⊢ ϕ, it suffices to check whether GLP ⊢ R + Θ (ϕ) → ϕ, where Θ denotes the set of modalities from ϕ. Note that R + Θ (ϕ) is polynomial in the size of ϕ. For hardness, reduce the task of checking whether GLP ⊢ ϕ as follows. Let ϕ ′ be a many-sorted formula that results from ϕ by assigning the sort ω to all propositional variables. It is easy to see that GLP ⊢ ϕ iff GLP * ⊢ ϕ ′ by the arithmetical completeness theorems for GLP and GLP * .
Conclusion
We have introduced a many-sorted variant, denoted GLP * , of Japaridze's polymodal logic GLP. GLP * is arithmetically sound and complete with respect to a broad class of arithmetical interpretations, where variables of sort below ω are interpreted as Π n -sentences from the arithmetical hierarchy. GLP has attracted a lot of interest in the mathematical logic community due to its proof-theoretic applications. It was noticed [8, 13] that the proof-theoretic analysis of PA due to Beklemishev [3] uses only a positive fragment of GLP that consists of formulas built up from ∧, ⊤, and n . Dashkov [13] axiomatized this fragment by a positive calculus and showed that theoremhood in this calculus is decidable in polynomial time. Moreover, such positive calculi admit a richer arithmetical interpretation than full GLP: variables can be interpreted as (primitive recursive enumerations of) possibly infinite theories rather than single sentences. The conjunction of two positive formulas is then interpreted as the union of the corresponding theories. Its richer arithmetical interpretation allows for the introduction of an additional modality ω that is arithmetically interpreted as the full uniform reflection principle (cf. [4, 16] ). This principle has no finite, yet a recursive axiomatization. Consequently, it is possible to include the corresponding modality in the positive calculus. This line of research was followed by Beklemishev [9] who provided arithmetical completeness results for a positive calculus containing such a modality in its language. These calculi (called reflection calculi) can be brought into the many-sorted setting as well: variables of sort n are interpreted as Π n+1 -axiomatizable extensions of PA, while those of sort ω are interpreted as arbitrary ones. Arithmetical completeness results can then be obtained in a similar fashion as presented in this work. We refer the reader to [11] for details.
